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Abstract 
The importance of board committees – specialized subgroups that exist to perform many of the board's most 
critical functions, such as setting executive compensation, identifying potential board members, and overseeing 
financial reporting – has grown over time due to increased legal requirements and greater complexity of the 
environment in which firms operate. This has resulted in a large body of work examining board committees 
across the accounting, finance, and management disciplines. However, this research has developed rather 
independently within each discipline, preventing scholars and practitioners from developing a comprehensive 
understanding of board committees. To address this issue, we conduct a comprehensive review of the literature 
that: 1) summarizes and synthesizes antecedents and outcomes associated with board committees in publicly-
traded firms in English common law countries; and 2) offers a critical analysis of existing research, providing 
recommendations for advancements and new directions in board committee research. 
Introduction 
Boards of directors are an integral part of a firm's governance system; monitoring and advising management 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and providing access to resources for firm adaptation (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Not surprisingly, prior research places substantial attention on understanding what 
makes boards effective, including their composition, leadership structure, decision processes, and dynamics 
(Dalton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2013; Krause et al., 2013; Withers et al., 2012). While these studies inform 
our understanding of the entire board, it is the specialized subgroups – the board's committees – that exist to 
manage details associated with its most critical functions, such as setting executive compensation, identifying 
new members, and overseeing financial reporting. 
Findings on the relationship between board structural characteristics and firm performance have been 
inconclusive (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998, 2003; Johnson et al., 2013). Additionally, boards have been criticized for 
failing to perform their fiduciary duties due to limited knowledge of firm intricacies, coordination and cohesion 
issues among directors, and social loafing among board members (Boivie et al., 2016). This has led some scholars 
to focus on board committees as the potential source for solving the inherent deficiencies of the full corporate 
board. Prior research has identified important features of committees that allow them to more diligently and 
comprehensively monitor and advise firm executives and thus contribute to firm outcomes. In particular, by 
being smaller, meeting more frequently, and drawing on the specialized expertise and abilities of their 
members, board committees can execute tasks with greater efficiency and expediency (Kesner, 1988). In 
addition, due to their well-defined purpose and clear expectations, it is suggested that board committees face 
greater scrutiny from various stakeholders, which reduces individual free-riding and encourages more effective 
implementation of their duties (Chen and Wu, 2016; Klein, 2002a). 
The importance of board committees has grown over time due to increased legal requirements and growing 
complexity of the business environment. Significantly greater demands are placed on board members’ time and 
attention, as evidenced by a nearly 50 per cent increase in committees’ activities and meetings across S&P 1500 
firms over the last 15 years (Adams et al., 2015). A long-established precept in organization theory is that firms 
develop specialized structures to handle complexity (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). For example, the multitude of 
transactions in which executives engage makes overseeing their activities more difficult, requiring the board to 
devise, approve and implement more intricate compensation contracts. Specialized committees, such as the 
compensation committee, enable boards to handle this complexity through subgroup-focused responsibility and 
expertise, while also limiting the demands placed on individual directors. Therefore, the specialized expertise of 
board committees is critical to the board's ability to reach effective decisions and fulfil its fiduciary duties. 
However, the nature of committees and their specialized focus is likely to lead to dynamics substantively 
different from those of the full board and may also create potential problems for both firm governance and 
adaptation to changing circumstances. Appointment to a major board committee represents higher status and 
importance for any director (Zhu et al., 2014). Status differences may be associated with greater director power. 
Hence, committees may represent a greater power nexus within the overall board of directors. Because board 
committees are smaller than the overall board, power is vested in a small number of directors for managing the 
specific issues within a committee's domain. While research on boards of directors overall suggests that smaller 
groups of directors will act more quickly (Goodstein et al., 1994), smaller groups are less likely to have a diversity 
of perspectives. Thus, if important board committees, such as the nominating committee, are dominated by a 
smaller, homogenous group of directors, the resource dependence role of the board (e.g., Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) could be compromised by a misalignment of firm resource needs with 
director capabilities and social capital. Thus, the vesting of certain board powers in a smaller subset of directors 
has the potential to both facilitate and impede the effectiveness of the board. 
As a result, research focused on board committee composition, dynamics, and impact on organizational 
outcomes is growing, particularly in the disciplines of accounting, finance, and management. This is illustrated in 
Table 1, which highlights the dramatic increase in studies examining board committees since 2001. However, 
board committee research has generally developed independently within these disciplines and the rich insights 
from each have remained confined to their respective fields. Additionally, due to substantial changes in 
governance, study samples and research questions prior to 2001 may not reflect recent governance practices. 
The lack of a systematic and integrative review of the literature prevents scholars and practitioners from 
developing a comprehensive understanding of what we know, don't know, and should know about board 
committees. To address this gap, we conduct a multidisciplinary review of board committee research, which 
aims to provide several contributions. First, we offer a summary of existing management, finance and 
accounting research on board committees and synthesize the main findings. In doing so, we outline and assess 
the main antecedents of board committees and the key outcomes that board committees influence. Second, we 
identify weaknesses and gaps in prior research that have prevented a more detailed understanding of board 
committees. In particular, we posit that our understanding of how committees operate is rather limited because 
scholars have extensively relied on committee structural characteristics. Instead, we suggest that a greater focus 
on social and human capital of committee members, for example, may further enhance our understanding of 
how committees operate in today's governance environment. Lastly, we focus on several underexplored areas 
and offer recommendations for moving board committee research forward in a manner more tightly integrated 
within the broader field of corporate governance. 
Table 1. Studies examining board committees (from this literature review) by year 
Year Studies 
Before 1990 5 
1990 to 1995 4 
1996 to 2000 16 
2001 to 2005 32 
2006 to 2010 40 
2011 to 2015 39 
2016 to 2018 6 
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we outline and define key board committees and their roles. Second, we 
detail our review criteria and categorize our review of antecedents and outcomes of board committees. Based 
on our findings from reviewing existing research, we then identify opportunities for future research to advance 
and expand our understanding of board committees’ role in corporate governance. 
Review of the Board Committee Literature 
Board Committees Defined 
Board committees exist for distinct purposes and are subgroups of directors currently sitting on a corporation's 
board. Table 2 outlines the purpose, composition requirements and typical functions of the three most common 
board committees for public firms in English common law countries, such as the United States, the United 




Table 2. Requirements and responsibilities of board committees in public firms 
Committee Membership 
requirements* 
Purpose Typical functions 
Audit 
Required: USA 
Required of large 
firms: UK, Canada and 
Australia 
Independent outside 
directors, one member 





Hire, manage and, if necessary, 
change auditor. 
Oversee financial reporting and 
accounting. 
Acquire other resources and 
expertise necessary for financial 
reporting and disclosure. 
Monitor the effectiveness of 
internal audit and management 
controls. 
Monitor corporate governance, 




Required of large 
firms: Australia 




Recommend to the 
board compensation 
structures of 
executives and board 
members. 
Determine the terms of 
engagement and compensation 
for the CEO and other senior 
executives. 
Oversee stock option packages 
and understand their effect on 
overall compensation. 
Operate long term, 





Comply or Explain: UK, 
Canada and Australia 
Fully independent 
outside directors 
(NYSE), majority of 
independent directors 
(NASDAQ). 
Seek and recommend 
new board members. 
Find candidates with proper 
credentials that can also work 
with current board chairman and 
members. 
Assess each director's 
performance, including meeting 
attendance and impact of other 
directorships. 
Make recommendations on re-
election. 








None Varies Functions are specific to the 
charter of the non-required 
committee. 
Often associated with focus on a 
specific problem and / or 
signaling commitment to 
concerns of shareholders and 
other external stakeholders. 
Sources: Calkoen (2017), Chen and Wu (2016), Laux and Laux (2009), Tricker (2015), Withers et al. (2012) 
* USA member requirements are stated. UK, Canada and Australia have similar but not identical requirements. 
** Comply or explain means committee existence or composition is strongly recommended by governance 
codes for firms. Deviations from board committee recommendations (i.e., non-compliance) must be explained in 
public securities filings. 
 
In the Unites States, certain committees have become required by law or stock exchange rules in the last several 
decades. For example, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter referred to as SOX) required all US-based 
publicly-traded firms to have an audit committee. Later, the two main US stock exchanges (NYSE and NASDAQ) 
enacted requirements that all listed firms’ boards have compensation and nominating committees. Because 
countries with institutions based in common law tend to have strong property rights and investor protections, 
the major stock exchanges in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom now require, at least for large firms, the 
existence of audit committees (Calkoen, 2017; Tricker, 2015). Relatedly, governance codes in these countries 
strongly recommend that large public firms have compensation and nominating committees whereby firms 
must file yearly governance documents that either attest to the existence of these committees or explain why 
the firm does not need the committee (i.e., this is commonly referred to as the ‘comply or explain’ rule in the 
UK). In practice, large public firms in the UK tend to comply with the governance code. Indeed, 90 per cent of 
FTSE 350 firms have both compensation and nominating committees (Calkoen, 2017). Compliance also tends to 
be very high in Canada and Australia for large firms.2 
Firms’ boards may also have additional committees specifically focused on areas such as strategic planning, the 
environment, or corporate social responsibility (CSR) that are not required by law but may reflect firm strategy, 
industry norms or a board's response to an issue or event. Boards continue to add committees, with over 75 per 
cent of S&P 500 firms having at least one committee beyond those required and 41 per cent having at least two 
additional committees as of 2016 (Ernst and Young Center for Board Matters, 2018). 
Method for Identifying Board Committee Studies 
Following a process similar to previous highly-cited high quality reviews (see Haleblian et al., 2009), we executed 
five steps to control our review's scope and ensure that our coverage of relevant studies was logical and 
comprehensive. First, we focused on quantitative, empirical research of board committees in the accounting, 
finance and management literatures. Second, given space limitations and the substantial volume of board 
committee research, we limited our review to articles that had been published in leading journals or were 
among the 100 most relevant published articles for each keyword in an electronic keyword search (to be 
described shortly). The number of articles included in our literature review tables from each journal, along with 
abbreviations for the journal titles, are shown in Appendix I. Third, due to significant variations in regulations 
and corporate governance across countries (Donaldson and Davis, 1994; Tricker, 2015), we only included studies 
of board committees for firms in the US, UK, Canada and Australia. As discussed previously, such countries have 
strong investor protections and have been at the forefront of the board committee movement. Other countries, 
such as Germany, have two-tiered boards, while some have weak director independence rules, and emerging 
economies still have developing corporate governance regimes (Aguilera, 2005). As such, our selected studies 
represent economies where the board committee paradigm is the most developed, with the three main 
committees either required or heavily emphasized by legal or institutional requirements, especially for large 
firms. 
Within the constraints of the first three steps, in our fourth step we used Google Scholar to search for 
keywords: board committee, subcommittee, audit committee, nominating committee, and compensation 
committee. This process yielded over 700 articles. Fifth, each article was reviewed to determine if it was relevant 
for this review. Many articles were eliminated because they did not specifically operationalize influences from or 
facets of one or more board committees, such as existence, composition, function, behaviour, or outcomes. 
Additionally, similar to previous reviews of board research (see Johnson et al., 2013), studies that examined not-
for-profit boards were eliminated. Subsequently, our review process identified 142 articles for inclusion; 57 from 
management, 42 from finance, and 43 from accounting journals. Of the 142 articles, 83 examined audit 
committees, 59 studied compensation committees and 39 focused on nominating/governance committees. 
Other committees examined include: environmental (6 studies), executive (4), public affairs (2), CSR (2), and 
strategic planning (2). Committees relating to public policy, ethics, finance, or technology were each explored in 
one study. 
After identifying the 142 articles, we then coded and categorized the articles. Primary variables and key findings 
were coded, enabling each article to first be placed into one of three categories: antecedents of board 
committees, outcomes associated with board committees, and non-required committees. Each article was then 
further grouped by its major topic within those three categories (e.g., executive compensation as an outcome). 
Thus, we report the 142 articles in seven literature review tables. Within each table, we then further sub-
categorized the articles by the focal topic of the study (e.g., committee composition for studies examining 
executive compensation). We also tried to identify the major theoretical frame used in the article. We were 
conservative in identifying the theoretical framework and only labelled it for a study in the tables if the authors 
clearly stated their theoretical background. As will be seen in the tables, some studies lack a theoretical frame as 
the authors took a more phenomenological focused approach in their study. The results from categorizing the 
articles are illustrated in Figure 1 and form the basis for the following discussions of the antecedents and 
outcomes of board committees. 
 
Figure 1 Overview of board committee research 
 
Antecedents of Board Committees 3 
A major research area has been the antecedents of board committees. Studies in this area examine questions 
such as: Why does the committee exist? What factors affect committee composition and independence? What 
factors influence committee practices (e.g., frequency of meetings)? Below, we discuss the following 
antecedents emphasized in prior research: legal requirements and institutional pressures, governance 
characteristics, director human capital and interlocks, director demography, and CEO behaviour (see Table 3). 
Legal requirements and institutional pressure 
A major driver of committee composition has been the mandatory legal requirements for greater diligence by 
committee members. In the US, SOX was the major catalyst for increased committee independence (i.e., 
reducing the number of insiders or affiliated directors), as audit, nominating and compensation committee 
independence rose to 92 per cent or more between 1998 and 2005 (Duchin et al., 2010).4 SOX has also 
encouraged more frequent meetings of audit and nominating committees, discouraged CEO membership on the 
nominating committee, and led to greater director turnover, especially for audit committee members, whose 
annual departure rate increased by over four per cent between 2001 and 2004 (Linck et al., 2008; Valenti, 2008). 
Stakeholder pressure also has increased committees’ monitoring capabilities. For example, Cheng et al. (2010) 
show that when an institutional investor is a lead plaintiff in a lawsuit against a firm, the firm's audit committee 
independence improves by over four per cent two years after the lawsuit was filed. Similarly, the existence of 
activist campaigns, such as ‘just vote no’ campaigns designed to withhold votes toward the election of directors, 
has encouraged firms to remove the CEO from the compensation committee (Del Guercio et al., 2008). 
Violation of legal requirements and established institutional norms, such as involvement in questionable 
activities, has been commonly examined as an antecedent to committee membership and composition. For 
example, Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) find that following financial restatements, audit committees face a 70 per 
cent increase in the likelihood of member turnover. Similarly, Srinivasan (2005) provides evidence that 
restatements for at least five quarters increase the likelihood of audit committee member removal by 10 per 
cent. Relatedly, when stock option backdating scandals occur, compensation and audit committee members are 
penalized by receiving fewer re-election votes and are more likely to step down (Ertimur et al., 2012). For 
instance, compensation committee members during the backdating period received 10 per cent fewer re-
election votes compared to a two to three per cent penalty for other directors. Since such violations undermine 
a firm's legitimacy, the firm undertakes aggressive efforts to disassociate itself from the guilty actors and restore 
its credibility among stakeholders (Suchman, 1995). As a result, severe penalties accrue to committee members 
who are tasked with, but fail to ensure, compliance to existing norms and regulations. 
Governance characteristics 
Another important committee antecedent is the quality of the firm's governance. Anderson and Reeb (2004), for 
instance, found that power wielded by founding-family members influenced nominating committee 
membership and, subsequently, board membership. Firms with weaker governance arrangements, such as the 
presence of overly sympathetic (i.e., cheerleader) directors, had, on average, 29 per cent fewer independent 
nominating committee members (Cohen et al., 2012). Similarly, weak governance systems have been associated 
with common membership among compensation and audit committees (Liao and Hsu, 2013). In contrast, 
strong-governance firms – those with more independent and active boards – are more likely to voluntarily form 
a governance committee (Huang et al., 2009). 
Director human capital and interlocks 
Many studies have used a human capital lens to examine how directors’ characteristics impact their 
membership on, and overall composition of, various committees. Viewing multiple directorships as evidence of a 
director's quality (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983), Masulis and Mobbs (2014) found that directors who sit on 
multiple boards are more likely to obtain additional committee memberships and chair a major committee. 
Those arguments are confirmed by Field et al. (2013), who provide evidence that busy directors (i.e., those 
sitting on three or more boards) have greater experience, qualifications and network connections, increasing 
their chances of serving on audit and nominating committees by 20 and 40 per cent, respectively. Kesner (1988) 
shows that characteristics indicating director competence and expertise in setting and overseeing the 
implementation of firm strategies, such as being an outsider, having business-related functional experience and 
serving longer on the board, are positively related to major committee membership. Similarly, Boivie et al. 
(2012) provide evidence that audit committee chairs are 29 per cent less likely to exit the firm, suggesting that 
firms take steps to retain the knowledge and experience associated with committees leaders. 
Director demography 
An emphasis in research on director demography has been the inclusion of female directors on board 
committees. Studies point to the existence of bias against female directors, suggesting little has changed from 
earlier findings that posit ‘women are not window dressing but do not hold important positions on the boards of 
large corporations’ (Kesner, 1988, p. 80). For example, after controlling for directors’ experience, scholars have 
found that women are less likely to be appointed to committees responsible for key governance functions of US 
firms (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Peterson and Philpot, 2007). Conyon and Mallin (1997) found a similar bias 
against women being appointed to key committees in UK firms, with women comprising only 2.49 per cent of 
board memberships in FTSE350 firms and only half of female directors serving on major committees. These 
findings suggest that there is a continued prevalence of deeply held stereotypes against female board members, 
as evidenced by women having career experience valuable to the board but perceived as lacking the experience 
necessary to serve on key committees (Heilman et al., 1989; Hillman et al., 2002). 
In a different vein, Zhu et al. (2014) find that directors who are similar to other directors along certain 
demographic characteristics are more likely to be accepted as both members and chairs of major board 
committees. While these studies inform our understanding of committee composition, further exploration is 
needed. Specifically, examining if and how age, racial and functional background diversity are associated with 
the composition and effectiveness of board committees may increase our understanding of committee 
membership and function, as well as the degree to which boards embrace diversity. Additionally, as prior 
research has found that a firm's links to other firms with female directors is positively related to female board 
members (Hillman et al., 2007), extending this research to the committee level may offer a greater 
understanding of the causes and degree of bias against female and other minority directors. 
CEO behavior 
The ways in which CEOs influence committee formation have also been examined. Westphal and Bednar (2008) 
showed that CEOs’ use of ingratiating behaviour and persuasion towards representatives of institutional 
investors helped prevent the formation of an independent nominating committee. Jones et al. (2015) offer 
empirical support for the argument that powerful CEOs are more likely to avoid or defy the adoption of a 
governance committee; a 20 per cent increase in CEO power relative to the board was associated with a 60 per 
cent decrease in adoption of a governance committee. While such power for CEOs is restricted to some degree 
by legal requirements, it still plays an important role in new director nomination and committee formation. 
Further research is encouraged to help understand how CEOs influence committee formation and composition, 
as well as new research that examines how power is developed and wielded within committees and in their 
interaction with CEOs. 
Outcomes of Board Committees  
An extensive body of research has examined the outcomes of board committees, seeking to explain how board 
committees’ existence, independence, composition and turnover influence important outcomes, including firm 
performance and value, executive compensation, financial misconduct and inappropriate behaviour, and 
accounting practices. It is important to acknowledge that while board committees might be instrumental in 
affecting the above outcomes, the full board also impacts those outcomes by ratifying committee decisions, 
although the extent to which authority is held and exercised at the board or committee level is largely unknown 
(see Tables 4-9). 
Firm performance and value 
A substantial volume of prior research has focused on how committee independence influences firm 
performance. Drawing on agency theory logic (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), scholars have argued that 
committee independence is critical for protecting shareholders’ interests because it allows for objective 
assessment of firm strategies and constrains CEO opportunistic behaviour. Research on audit committee 
independence generally finds a positive relationship between independence and performance. For example, 
Aggarwal and colleagues in two studies found a positive impact from audit committee independence on firm 
value and market return (Aggarwal et al., 2008, 2011). Relatedly, the presence of expert independent audit 
committee members positively influences firm performance (Chan and Li, 2008), and the market positively 
receives announcements of financial experts joining audit committees (Davidson et al., 2004; DeFond et 
al., 2005). Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) further illustrate the focus on and importance of committee member 
independence by showing that the death of an independent audit committee member is associated with a two 
per cent abnormal drop in stock price. Notably, however, Klein (2002b) reported a negative association between 
audit committee independence and financial performance. 
Somewhat contrarily, studies examining the effects of nominating and compensation committee independence 
on firm performance have produced rather ambiguous results. Some studies report that when these two 
committees are independent, firms exhibit higher performance (Grove et al., 2011; Hoechle et al., 2012) and are 
more likely to avoid bankruptcy (Platt and Platt, 2012). Yet, other studies find a positive relationship between 
insiders on the nominating committee and market return, suggesting the importance of management 
participation in director selection (e.g., Callahan et al., 2003). In particular, Klein (1998) provides evidence that a 
more independent compensation committee results in lower productivity from the firm's long-term assets. 
Similarly, Faleye (2007) found nominating committee independence was associated with a 12 to 14 per cent 
lower market return. The equivocal pattern of findings for nominating and compensation committees suggests 
that committee independence may have positive benefits for some firms, while imposing burdens on others. 
However, these equivocal results may also be driven by reliance on datasets from different eras. In addition, the 
mixed results across different committee types should serve as caution against claims that independence is the 
panacea for reducing agency costs when examining the monitoring function of board committees. 
Beyond the effects of committee independence, prior research also provides evidence regarding committees’ 
attention to their tasks and firm performance. Falato et al. (2014) found that a busy director who serves on 
another board in which that firm incurs the death of the CEO or board member was associated with a 1.37 per 
cent decrease in stock price, while Dey (2008) found that an effective audit committee (e.g., fully independent, 
meets more often, has a financial expert) increases financial return for all levels of agency conflicts. No 
relationship has been found for committee gender and racial diversity with firm performance (Carter et 
al., 2010). 
Executive compensation 
As with firm performance, most studies have utilized agency theory to investigate relationships between 
committee characteristics and oversight of executive compensation. Consistent with agency theory, some 
studies find that strong committee governance constrains managerial attempts to capture larger and potentially 
unmerited financial compensation. For example, blockholders sitting on the compensation committee has been 
found to be associated with decreases in total CEO compensation and increases in equity incentives (Conyon 
and He, 2004). Similarly, Cyert et al. (2002) report that doubling compensation committee members’ stock 
ownership results in about a four per cent reduction in predicted CEO contingent compensation and about a five 
per cent reduction in predicted CEO equity compensation, while Sun and Cahan (2009) show that CEO cash 
compensation is more tightly linked to accounting earnings for compensation committees with higher quality.6 
Committee member independence has also been a point of emphasis in studies of compensation committees in 
non-US firms, with studies finding that independence positively moderates the relationships of non-proxy-based 
activism, involving verbal steps taken by activist shareholders (e.g., statements to the media), with Canadian 
CEO contingent compensation (Chowdhury and Wang, 2009) and U.K. top management pay with firm 
performance (Conyon and Peck, 1998). In contrast, the absence of diligent committee monitoring allows CEOs to 
extract greater pay. For example, CEOs enjoy bonuses relative to merger deal sizes that are approximately 100 
per cent greater when they sit on the nominating committee (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), and approximately 30 
per cent greater total compensation when audit committee members are linked to, and socially dependent on, 
the CEO (Hwang and Kim, 2009). In line with those findings, Stathopolous et al. (2004) provide evidence that 
total pay for UK CEOs, via issuance of in-the-money stock options, increases when they sit on the compensation 
committee. 
However, some research offers findings which do not support agency theory arguments. Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2009) fail to find evidence that compensation and nominating committee independence are related 
to CEO compensation. Moreover, Guthrie et al. (2012) found that two outliers in Chhaochharia and Grinstein's 
study (Apple and Fossil) biased their study and, after accounting for outliers, find that requirements for 
compensation committee independence lead to increases in US CEO total pay; findings consistent with those of 
Masulis et al. (2012) who report a positive relationship between foreign independent directors on the 
compensation committee and CEO pay. Finally, the presence of ‘captured’ board members on the compensation 
committee was found to not be associated with greater changes in CEO compensation and total CEO 
compensation (Daily et al., 1998). Captured board members are directors who are affiliated with the firm (i.e., 
personal or professional relationships with the firm or its executives) or are interdependent (i.e., appointed after 
the CEO started in his or her position). Such findings that conflict with agency theory arguments suggest that 
directors serving on powerful committees, regardless of whether they are independent, may prioritize their 
obligation to shareholders (Daily, 1996; Daily et al., 1998) or that an optimal contracting perspective, in which 
higher CEO compensation reflects the market price for greater managerial quality, supersedes agency theory in 
some contexts (Masulis et al., 2012). 
Overall, our review of compensation committee influence reveals support for agency theory predictions of CEO 
compensation is rather mixed. This is likely why scholars use other theoretical frameworks with agency theory. 
In particular, recent work argues that committees’ monitoring can be enhanced when members have sufficient 
knowledge and expertise. Building theory on knowledge transfer and exchange, Brandes et al. (2016) examined 
how linking ‘pin’ directors (i.e., directors serving on the audit and compensation committees) are associated 
with reduced CEO compensation. In a study focusing on other top executives, Gore et al. (2011) find support for 
the presence of a finance committee or a CEO with a financial background leading to lower incentive-based pay 
for the chief financial officer, arguing that this supported relationship is evidence that financial expertise is an 
important component of effective monitoring. 
Moving away from agency theory, scholars have attempted to provide alternative explanations of how and why 
board committees impact executive compensation. Young and Buchholtz (2002) employ social identity theory 
and the similarity-attraction paradigm to argue that CEOs are treated more favourably when they are 
demographically similar to the compensation committee. The authors find that CEO pay is more closely tied to 
firm performance when compensation committee members’ tenure is more dissimilar to the CEO's tenure. 
Belliveau et al. (1996) also examine similarity, but focus on social status differences between CEOs and their 
compensation committee chairs. Consistent with the position that social status affects influence and 
dependence among individuals, the study indicates that a CEO with higher relative social status than the 
compensation committee chair receives greater compensation. Alternatively, a compensation committee chair 
with higher social status than the CEO constrains CEO pay. 
A nascent, but growing research stream focuses on the effects of CEO and compensation committee members’ 
political beliefs on compensation. Using political psychology and upper echelon perspectives, Gupta and Wowak 
(2017) found that politically conservative compensation committees, in which their members have donated 
more often, over a longer period of time and in greater amounts to the Republican party in the US, were 
positively associated with total CEO pay and greater rewards for strong financial performance. On the other 
hand, Chin and Semadeni (2017) found that politically liberal CEOs and compensation committees, who 
prioritize both egalitarianism and equality, are associated with greater pay equality among non-CEO executives. 
These two studies are examples of how established management theory can be integrated with social constructs 
to offer new and relevant insights into corporate governance. 
Finally, research has examined the criteria compensation committees use to determine executive compensation. 
In their test of which of two theories better explain CEO compensation, O'Reilly et al. (1988) found no support 
for a tournament theory argument in which CEO pay is greater when a firm has more vice presidents. However, 
the authors found support for a model developed from social comparisons and suggested this finding indicates 
that compensation committee members’ judgments on CEO pay are anchored by their own pay. Relatedly, 
scholars have argued that compensation committees may consider the regulatory environment (Perry and 
Zenner, 2001), anticipated market rates (Ezzamel and Watson, 2002), and compensation across unrelated firms 
(Faulkender and Yang, 2010) to determine CEO pay at their own firms. 
Misconduct and inappropriate behaviour 
Common types of questionable firm behaviour include earnings management, fraud/crime, and stock option 
manipulation. While financial reporting requires judgment, firms have techniques to create unjustifiably positive 
views of earnings, such as taking abnormal accruals. Research, however, has consistently shown that stronger 
monitoring by committees, measured as having a majority of independent directors serving on at least two of 
the three major committees, reduces abnormal accruals7 (Faleye et al., 2011). For example, Klein (2002a) found 
that audit committee independence was negatively associated with abnormal accruals. Badolato et al. (2014) 
examined audit committees’ status (i.e., career advancement, achievement and prestige) relative to 
management and financial expertise, finding that both were positively associated with lower abnormal accruals 
and reduced accounting irregularities. Bedard et al. (2004) had similar findings, but also found that excluding 
audit committee members from receiving stock options reduced aggressive earnings management. Additionally, 
Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2013) considered social network ties from friendships and advice networks between 
audit committee members and CEOs, finding that friendship ties were positively associated with earnings 
management, as well as auditors reporting internal control weaknesses and going-concerns. Finally, audit 
committee independence and legal expertise have been found to enhance the quality of financial reporting and 
reduce the likelihood of restatement (Abbott et al., 2004; Krishnan et al., 2011). 
In a study of firms committing white collar crime, Schnatterly (2003) found that actions associated with strong 
governance (i.e., audit committee independence, more frequent meetings) did not impact the likelihood of a 
first criminal event but did impact the likelihood of subsequent criminal activity. Uzun et al. (2004) reported 
similar findings, but their study further suggested that the percentage of grey directors (i.e., outside directors 
having some non-board affiliation with the firm) on major committees was positively associated with fraud. 
Interestingly, while studies of fraud remain common today, we identified no committee studies in which crime is 
operationalized as criminal charges against firms following the 2002 passage of SOX in the US. 
The manipulation of stock option pricing is another behaviour that has received attention. Bebchuk et al. (2010) 
examined the opportunistic granting of stock options and found the existence of an independent compensation 
committee did not influence opportunistic stock option grants, but the presence of a large blockholder on an 
independent compensation committee reduced opportunistic grant timing by 71 per cent. Blockholders on the 
compensation committee, as well as an outsider as compensation committee chair, were also negatively 
associated with the likelihood of stock option repricing (Callaghan et al., 2004). However, directors serving on 
the compensation and nominating committee profited more from buying and selling their firm's stock than 
directors serving on the audit or other committees (Cao et al., 2014), suggesting information asymmetries may 
exist even among directors on the same board. 
Overall, our review of prior work revealed that greater expertise and stronger diligence at the committee level, 
especially in the audit committee, are appropriate mechanisms for preventing or reducing managerial 
misconduct. However, we were surprised that little attention has been paid to committee member misconduct 
and how board committees restore trust following fraud and other types of inappropriate behaviour. Farber's 
(2005) results suggest that firms recovering from fraud have more frequent audit committee meetings, while 
Chan et al. (2012) found that audit committee size was positively associated with adopting clawback provisions 
(i.e., compensation recovery provisions that allow the firm to recoup compensation from its executives involved 
in accounting improprieties). Yet, no research was identified that examined changes in nominating or 
compensation committee membership or function when firms were attempting to recover from trust violations. 
Accounting practices 
Research primarily from the accounting field has also examined how audit committee diligence and quality 
impact accounting practices. For example, financial reporting quality, measured as fewer restatements and 
discretionary accruals, was improved by the audit committee having greater legal and accounting expertise 
(Krishnan et al., 2011), as well as a greater number of accounting and industry experts (Cohen et al., 2013). 
Similarly, fully independent and active audit committees were associated with a reduced likelihood of 
restatements and larger recognition of loan loss provisions (Abbott et al., 2004; Leventis et al., 2013). Indeed, in 
pre-IPO firms the mere presence of an audit committee can reduce accruals (Venkataraman et al., 2008). Finally, 
effective audit committees help managers make more accurate earnings forecasts that result in positive market 
reactions (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
Other firm-level outcomes 
The relationship of committee composition with other firm outcomes has also received attention. Gomulya and 
Boeker (2016) studied CEO replacement following a financial restatement and found a positive relationship 
between replacing an audit committee member and the likelihood of CEO replacement, suggesting that multiple 
actors could receive blame for financial misconduct. In addition, Zhang (2008) found that the likelihood of a new 
CEO's dismissal was reduced by the presence of an independent nominating committee when the CEO was 
hired, and further reduced when nominating committee members had fewer other directorships. Guo and 
Masulis (2015) found that nominating committee independence resulted in more effective CEO monitoring and 
discipline. In line with those findings, Anderson et al. (2004) reported that firms with larger and independent 
audit committees have lower costs of debt financing (i.e., they obtain debt more cheaply). Further, research has 
indicated that greater committee independence can limit firm involvement in value-decreasing acquisitions 
(Faleye et al., 2011; Fracassi and Tate, 2012). Indeed, the relationship of major board committee independence 
with outcomes such as leadership, structural change and more effective financing provides strong support for 
the beneficial role of independence for major board committees. Comparing these results with the equivocal 
findings on the link between board committee independence and firm performance suggests that performance 
may be less controllable by board committees than more proximal drivers of performance. 
Less traditional committees 
A small number of studies examined the function and outcomes of other less traditional committees which have 
yielded valuable insights into firms’ priorities and actions. The presence of a strategic planning committee was 
found to be related to executives participation in strategic planning (Henke, 1986) and a lesser likelihood of 
focusing on short-term financial outcomes at the expense of long-term initiatives (Beekun et al., 1998). The 
presence of an environmental committee was found to increase transparency related to environmental issues 
(Peters and Romi, 2014), improve a firm's environmental performance (Walls et al., 2012), and reduce industry 
fines (Davidson and Worrell, 2001). While these studies provide insights regarding the presence and actions of 
less common committees, further research examining the roles and impact of such committees is needed. Firms 
and their boards may be pre-dispositioned to prioritize certain issues (e.g., strategic planning, environmental) 
and, thus, the presence of a committee may only be a related outcome. Additionally, external stakeholders, 
analysts and media may emphasize that specific domains require firm attention following a reputation damaging 
event (e.g., environmental violation), resulting in a committee being formed that may or may not have the 
necessary intentions and discretion to prioritize actions over other firm initiatives. Studies examining the actions 
and outcomes of firms adding such committees following poor performance in the associated domain may yield 
valuable insights into how such committees affect executive behavior, stakeholder perceptions of the firm, and 
firm outcomes. 
Cross-Disciplinary Comparison 
One advantage of a cross-disciplinary approach to reviewing board committee research is capturing a sizeable 
breadth of the literature, as well as differences in theoretical and empirical specifications. As noted previously, 
committee research has accumulated in isolation across the management, finance and accounting disciplines. 
However, one similarity across disciplines is the relative dominance of agency theory as a theoretical framework 
(see Tables 4 through 9). 





Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if 




   
Armstrong, Core, 
and Guay, 2014; 
JFE 
  A Firms required to increase audit committee independence 
had a greater decrease in information asymmetry. (e) 
Arthaud-Day, 
Certo, Dalton, and 
Dalton, 2006; AMJ 
RD, Agency, 
Institutional 
A Audit committee member turnover was 70% more likely 
following restatements. Stock market reaction to 
restatements and external prompting for restatements were 
not found to increase the likelihood of audit committee 
member turnover. 
Cheng, Huang, Li, 
and Lobo, 2010; 
JFE 
Agency A Institutional lead plaintiff leads to greater independence of 
the audit committee. (e) 
Del Guercio, Seery, 
and 
Woidtke, 2008; JFE 
  C 54 activist campaigns identified in which the proponent 
requests one or more specific and measurable actions, such 
as removing the CEO from the compensation committee. 
Duchin, Matsusaka 
and Ozbas, 2010; 
JFE 
  A, C, 
N 
From 1998 to 2005, percentage of independent directors 
rose on audit committees from 81 to 95% on audit 
committees, 72 to 92% on nominating committees, and 85 
to 94% on compensation committees. (e) 
Ertimur, Ferri, and 
Maber, 2012; JFE 
  A, C Audit committee members penalized via fewer votes when 
up for re-election when backdating has occurred, but less 
than compensation committee members. For firms involved 
in backdating, significant penalties (votes withheld when up 
for re-election) accrued to compensation committee 
members, particularly those who served during backdating 
period. 
Linck, Netter, and 
Yang, 2008; RFS 
  A, N After SOX, audit and nominating committee members met 
more often, some firms increased audit committee chair and 
member compensation, and director turnover increased 
substantially – particularly for audit committee members. 
Laing and 
Weir, 1999; MD 
  All U.K. firms, especially larger ones, followed the Cadbury 
Committee's recommendation that they employ a board 
committee structure, but there is little evidence that this 





A High risk of turnover for audit committee members when 
there are severe income-decreasing restatements. The 
relationship was weaker for income-increasing 
restatements. 
Valenti, 2008; JBE Agency, RD A, N SOX was positively related to audit committee members 
who were CPAs or CFOs, but negatively related to CEO 
membership on nominating committees. 
Governance 
characteristics 
   
Anderson and 
Reeb, 2004; ASQ 
Agency, 
Stewardship 
N Founding-family presence on the nominating committee is 
negatively associated with the proportion of directors that 
are independent. (e) 
Cohen, Frazzini, 
and Malloy, 2012; 
MS 
Agency N Firms with overly sympathetic (i.e., cheerleader) directors 
have 29% fewer independent nominating committee 
directors, are 30% less likely to be majority independent, 
and more likely to have CEO serve on the nominating 
committee. (e) 
Huang, Lobo, and 
Zhou, 2009; CGIR 
Substitution G Firms with a larger, more independent and more active 
board, higher agency costs, and past occurrence of class-
action lawsuits are more likely to voluntarily form a 
governance committee. Governance committees constrain 
managerial opportunism by reducing aggressive financial 
reporting. (e) 
Liao and 
Hsu, 2013; CGIR 
  A, C Common membership among compensation and audit 
committee is more likely in firms with weak corporate 
governance and lacking financial and committee resources. 
Firms with common membership have poorer earnings 





power theory of 
director 
selection 
N Firms appoint fewer independent outside directors and 
more directors with potential conflicts of interest when CEO 
serves on the nominating committee or no nominating 
committee exists. CEO involvement with director selections 
negatively moderates the relationship of independent 
director announcements with stock price reactions. (e) 
Vafeas, 1999; JFE Contracting, 
Agency 
All U.K. firms with a greater number of committees have more 
board meetings. No relationship found for the number of 




   
Boivie, Graffin, and 
Pollock, 2012; AMJ 
Self-
determination 
A, C Serving as chair of the audit committee reduces the 
likelihood of a director exiting the board by 29%, but serving 
as compensation committee chair increases the likelihood of 
a director exiting the firm by 23%. 
Cai, Garner, and 
Walkling, 2009; 
JOF 
  A, C, 
G 
Directors serving on the audit, compensation and 
governance committees receive fewer retention votes. 
Compensation committee members receive fewer votes 
when the CEO receives higher abnormal compensation. 
Fewer votes for governance committee members increase 
the likelihood of poison pill removal. Governance committee 
member vote distribution influences the likelihood of 
declassification. (e) 
Erkens and 
Bonner, 2012; TAR 
  A, N Firm status (i.e., larger, better connected, more admired) is 
negatively related to the probability of naming an 
accounting financial expert to the audit committee. Social 
status is lower for accounting financial experts on board 





Agency A, C Directors with more than two appointments participate in 
more committee meetings, have more committee 
memberships, and chair more committees than directors 
with one or two directorships. 
Field, Lowry, and 




A, N Director busyness is positively related to serving on the audit 
and nominating committees. (e) 
Kesner, 1988; AMJ Agency, RD A, C, 
N, G, 
Ex 
Board members that are outsiders, have business-related 
functional experience and have served longer on the board 
are positively associated with major committee 
membership. Gender was not related to major board 
committee membership. 
Masulis and 
Mobbs, 2014; JFE 
  A, C, 
N 
Major committee membership is associated with 
significantly fewer absences. Sitting on more prestigious 
boards is positively related to being a member of the audit 
or compensation committee. (e) 
Director 
demography 
   
Bilimoria and 






Men were preferred for membership on compensation and 
executive committees, while women were preferred for 
public affairs committees. 
Conyon and 
Mallin, 1997; CGIR 
  A, C, 
N 
While there are few women on the boards of UK firms, their 
membership on key board committees is even lower. 
(United Kingdom, e) 
Peterson and 
Philpot, 2007; JBE 
RD All Women more likely to sit on public-affairs committee and 
less likely to sit on executive committee. No relationship 
found between gender and sitting on nominating, 
compensation, finance and audit committees. 
Zhu, Shen, and 






Similarity to committee members positively related to 
likelihood of being appointed as major committee member 
or chair. Incumbents' prior experience with demographically 
different directors is positively related to likelihood of being 
appointed chair of a major committee. 
CEO behavior    
Jones, Li, and 
Cannella, 2015; 
JOM 
Institutional N, G CEOs more powerful than the board are more likely to avoid 
adoption of a governance committee. Firms with a 
nominating committee adopted governance committees 
faster. Prior service on any committee positively related to 






N Increased likelihood of manager or outside director receiving 
a board appointment when they exhibit ingratiating 
behaviour towards a CEO or director on the nominating 
committee. 
Westphal and 




N CEO ingratiating behaviour and persuasion attempts are 
negatively related to creation of a nominating committee. 
CEO persuasion attempts with institutional investors 
negatively moderate the relationship between institutional 
ownership and the creation of independent nominating 
committee. (e) 
For Theoretical Frame: (RD) Resource Dependence Theory, (SC) Social Comparison Theory, (SN) Social 
Networking Theory. 
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (Ex) Executive, (G) 
Governance, (N) Nominating, (PA) Public Affairs. 
Table 4. Outcomes: Firm performance and value 
Authors, Year; Journal Theoretical 
frame 
Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United 
States; e, if endogeneity was addressed in 
methods) 
Committee independence 
affecting firm performance and 
value 
   
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and 
Matos, 2011; JFE 
Agency A Audit committee independence is positively 
related to firm performance. (Canada, United 
Kingdom, United States, Australia; e) 
Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and 
Williamson, 2008; RFS 
 
A Audit committee independence is associated 
with higher firm value. (Canada, United Kingdom, 
United States, Australia, e) 
Callahan, Millar, and 





N CEO and other insider membership on 
nominating committee is positively related to 
market return. Number of nominating 
committee meetings is negatively related to 
market return. Delegating nominating 
responsibility to another committee with CEO 
involvement is positively related to market 
return. Percentage of outside CEOs on 
nominating committee is negatively related to 
market return. 
Chan and Li, 2008; CGIR Agency A Presence of expert, independent directors on the 
audit committee enhances firm value. (e) 
Chhaochharia and 




With new rules for committee independence, 
firms with fewer independent committees have 
higher abnormal stock returns. Effect greatest 
for medium/large firms, with less abnormal 
returns for small firms without independence, 
suggesting independence requirements impose 
significant costs on small firms. 
Daily, 1996; SMJ Agency, RD A Affiliated directors on the audit committee are 
positively related to pre-packaged bankruptcy 
filings and negatively related to time spent in 
reorganization. 
Faleye, 2007; JFE Agency N Nominating committee independence negatively 
related to firm value, positively related to 
director turnover, and positively moderates 
impact of shareholder wealth changes on CEO 
compensation. (e) 
Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, and 
Xu, 2011; CGIR 
Agency A, C Weak evidence of a negative association of 
affiliated committees with financial performance 
in the period leading to the financial crisis. (e) 
Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and 
Yermack, 2012; JFE 
Agency N An independent nominating committee is 
negatively related to excess firm value and 
positively related to cumulative abnormal 
returns from a diversifying acquisition. 
Diversified firms are less likely to have an 
independent nominating committee. (e) 
Klein, 1998; JLE Agency, FR C Percentage of outside directors on the 
compensation committee is negatively related to 
productivity. The market reacts positively to the 
announcement of an increased percentage of 
outside directors on the compensation 
committee. (e) 
Klein, 2002b; TAR Agency, TCE A Audit committee independence is positively 
related to board size and independence and 
negatively related to firm growth and financial 
performance. (e) 
Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010; JFE Agency A, N The death of an independent member of the 
audit or nominating committee is negatively 
associated with abnormal negative returns. (e) 




Major committee's size and percentage of 
independent directors positively related and 
percentage of grey directors on the audit and 
compensation committee negatively related to 
firm avoiding bankruptcy. 
Director expertise affecting firm 
performance and value 
   
Davidson, Xie, and Xu, 2004; 
JAPP 
Agency A Newly announced audit committee members 
with experience in financial oversight, employed 
by a CPA firm, or working as an audit consultant 
are positively associated with cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
DeFond, Hann, and Hu, 2005; 
JAR 
 
A Naming an accounting financial expert to the 
audit committee is positively related to market 
reaction; this relationship is positively 
moderated by strong governance. 
Interlocks affecting firm 
performance and value 
   
Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; JFE 
 
A Investor reactions at interlocked firms are more 
negative if a director being sued serves on the 
interlocked firm's audit committee. Outside 
directors are more likely to lose other board 
appointments when the outside director sits on 
the audit committee of the interlocked firm. 
Kang, 2008; AMJ Signalling, 
Attribution 
A, G Reputational penalties, measured as cumulative 
abnormal returns, are associated with 
interlocked board members serving as audit chair 
of an accused or associated firm and for an 
interlocked board member being the governance 




affecting firm performance and 
value 
   
Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, and 





No significant relationship found between the 
gender or ethnic diversity of important board 
committees and financial performance for a 
sample of major US corporations. (e) 
Dey, 2008; JAR Agency A Audit committee effectiveness is positively 
related to the level of agency conflicts and to 
financial and market performance for all levels of 
agency within firms. (e) 
Fich, Cai, and Tran, 2011; JFE Agency C A busy compensation committee leads to more 
rent extraction in target firms. CEOs of target 
firms get more options and shareholders suffer 
more value loss. (e) 
Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and 
Lel, 2014; JFE 
Agency A, C, 
N 
CEO or a director's death at firm A makes other 
interlocked directors on major committees of 
firm B busier and this results in lower cumulative 
abnormal returns. Results are stronger for the 
audit committee. (e) 
Faleye, Hoitash, and 
Hoitash, 2011; JFE 
Agency A, C, 
N 
Independent directors serving on at least 2 of the 
3 monitoring committees improve board's 
monitoring quality (e.g., increased sensitivity of 
turnover to firm performance, less discretionary 
accruals, reduced excess compensation). Yet, 
improved monitoring jeopardizes board advising 
quality and results in lower acquisition 
performance and lower innovation. In firms with 
high advising needs, weaknesses in board 
advising outweigh the benefits of intense 
monitoring and lead to reduction in firm value. 
(e) 
Gerety, Hoi, and Robin, 2001; 
FM 
Agency N Relationship of stock market reaction to 
proposals of incentive plans for board members 
is negatively moderated by the CEO being on or 
the firm not having a nominating committee. 
Yermack, 1997; JOF 
 
C Firms receive lower cumulative abnormal returns 
following option awards when the compensation 
committee includes a non-executive board chair 
or an outside blockholder. CEOs can change the 
timing of stock option grants by influencing the 
timing of the compensation meeting. 
For Theoretical Frame: (FR) Free Rider, (RD) Resource Dependence Theory, (TCE) Transaction Cost Economics. 
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (G) Governance, (N) 
Nominating. 
Table 5. Outcomes: Executive compensation 
Authors, Year; Journal Theoretical 
frame 
Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if 
endogeneity was addressed in methods) 
Committee 
independence 
   
Capezio, Shields, and 




C Non-executive members on Australian firms’ compensation 
committees positively associated with non-incentive CEO 
pay, but no relationship found between compensation 
committee independence and CEO incentive pay and total 
pay. (Australia, e) 
Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2009; JOF 
  C, N Following the passage of SOX, firms previously 
noncompliant with new requirements have a 17% 
reduction in compensation associated with board 
independence. No effect found for nominating and 
compensation committee independence with CEO 
compensation. (e) 
Chowdhury and 
Wang, 2009; JOM 
Salience, 
Agency 
C Compensation committee independence positively 
moderates the relationship of non-proxy-based activism 
with the portion of Canadian CEOs’ compensation that is 
contingent. No significant interaction found for 
compensation committee independence and proxy-based 
activism. (Canada) 
Conyon and 
Peck, 1998; AMJ 
  C, N Outside directors on the remuneration committee of UK 
firms positively influenced the relationship of top 
management pay with corporate performance. Outside 
directors on the nominating committee did not influence 
the pay-for-performance relationship. (United Kingdom) 
Daily, Johnson, 
Ellstrand, and 




C Affiliated or interdependent directors were not found to 
change the level, or the mix of types, of compensation. 
Ferrell, Liang, and 
Renneboog, 2016; JFE 
Agency C For worldwide firms, including non-investment trust firms 
in the FTSE250, independent compensation committee 
negatively related to CEO total compensation. Excessive 
CEO pay negatively related to corporate social 
responsibility. (Canada, United Kingdom, United States, 
Australia, e) 
Focke, Maug, and 
Niessen-Ruenzi, 2017; 
JFE 
  C The effect of a firm's prestige on CEO compensation is 
stronger in firms with independent compensation 
committees. (e) 
Guthrie, Sokolowsky, 
and Wan, 2012; JOF 
  C, N Requirements for compensation committee independence 
increased CEO and non-CEO executive compensation. 
Hwang and Kim, 2009; 
JFE 
Agency A CEOs whose audit committees are conventionally 
independent, but socially linked to the CEO, receive larger 
bonuses than equivalent CEOs whose audit committees are 
conventionally and socially independent. 
Main and 
Johnston, 1993; ABR 
Agency, 
Anchoring 
C Presence of a compensation committee in UK firms 
positively associated with CEO pay, but not associated with 
the incentive structure of pay. (United Kingdom) 
Masulis, Wang and 
Xie, 2012; JAE 
Agency A, C Foreign independent directors on audit committees are 
positively associated with restatements. Foreign 
independent director on compensation committee are 
associated with higher CEO compensation and a lower 
percentage of equity-based CEO compensation. (e) 
Committee 
composition 
   
Belliveau, O'Reilly, 
and Wade, 1996; AMJ 
sc, sn C Compensation committee chair status associated with 
reduced CEO compensation. CEOs with higher social status 
than the compensation committee chair receive 16% 
higher pay. CEOs paired with a low-status compensation 
committee chair receive higher pay than CEOs paired with 
a high-status chairs. 
Brandes, Dharwadkar, 
and Suh, 2016; SMJ 
Agency, UE A, C Member overlap among compensation and audit 
committees suppresses total compensation and is 
positively associated with salary, but not equity, as a 
proportion of total compensation. Committee overlap 
negatively associated with total compensation and 
positively associated with CEO salary. Committee overlap 
has a stronger negative effect on total and equity based 
compensation when less conservative accounting practices 
are followed. (e) 




C Venture capitalists on compensation committee and 
committee member pay negatively associated and 
blockholders positively associated with equity incentives. 
Compensation committee member pay positively 
associated with CEO compensation. No support for 
managerial power model determinants with CEO 
compensation and equity. 
Grinstein and 
Hribar, 2004; JFE 
Agency, MP N CEO on the nominating committee associated with greater 
CEO bonus pay. (e) 
Stathopoulos, 
Espenlaub, and 
Walker, 2004; JMAR 
Agency, MP, 
Perceived Cost 
C Other executives on UK compensation committees 
negatively associated with non-executive salary plus bonus 
and positively associated with non-executive total pay. CEO 
or only non-executives on compensation committee 
positively associated with CEO total pay. CEO on 
compensation committee negatively associated with other 
executives’ long term pay. (United Kingdom) 
Young and 




C Age dissimilarity between compensation committee 
members and the CEO positively related to CEO total 
compensation change. Relationship negatively moderated 
by firm performance. Firm performance positively 
moderates relationship between tenure dissimilarity and 
change in total CEO compensation. 
Political orientation    
Chin and 
Semadeni, 2017; SMJ 
UE C The liberalism of the compensation committee strengthens 
the positive relationship between CEO liberalism and TMT 
horizontal pay equality. (e) 
Gupta and 
Wowak, 2017; ASQ 
Agency, UE C Compensation committee political conservatism is 
positively related to CEO pay. Financial performance 
positively moderates the relationship of compensation 
committee conservatism and CEO pay. (e) 
Committee 
characteristics 
   
Cyert, Kang, and 
Kumar, 2002; MS 
Agency, MP, 
Options 
C Compensation committee members’ stock ownership in 
company negatively related to CEO base salary, equity 
compensation, and discretionary compensation. 
Compensation committee members’ stock ownership 
negatively associated with CEO discretionary compensation 
in small, but not large, firms. 
Persons, 2006; JBE   C No reduction in compensation for firms with fraud or 
lawsuits if there is a larger compensation committee. 
Compensation committee characteristics not associated 
with CEO dismissal if there is fraud or lawsuit. 
Sun and Cahan, 2009; 
CGIR 
Agency C CEO current compensation more positively associated with 
accounting earnings when firms have higher compensation 
committee quality. Positive effect of compensation 
committee quality on the association between CEO current 
compensation and accounting earnings is less in high 
growth or loss-making firms. (e) 
Tosi and Gomez-
Mejia, 1989; ASQ 
Agency C Monitoring of CEO pay is positively related to 
compensation committee influence in both management 
and owner controlled firms. 
Committee anchoring    
Adut, Cready, and 
Lopez, 2003; TAR 
  C Compensation committees intervene to modify the firm's 
net income used to determine CEO compensation when 
there are reported restructurings; The extent of the 
intervention is dependent on the frequency of the 
restructurings and CEO tenure. 
Bizjak, Lemmon, and 
Naveen, 2008; JFE 
  C Boards use various criteria (e.g., referencing peer firms, 
firm size, relative performance) to determine CEO 
compensation structure. 
Ezzamel and 
Watson, 2002; JMS 
Equity, SC C UK compensation committees adjust CEO pay in line with 
anticipated market rates, rather than being consistent with 
pay changes for other committee members. (United 
Kingdom) 
Faulkender and 
Yang, 2010; JFE 
  C Compensation committees seem to endorse compensation 
peer groups that include unrelated firms, possibly because 
such firms would potentially ratchet up the level of pay for 
the CEOs 
Fich, Starks, and 
Yore, 2014; JFE 
Agency C Deal-making firms’ boards are significantly less likely than 
non-deal-making boards to cite financial performance 
measures as justification for increasing CEO pay and to 
mention growth as a rationale for compensation decisions. 
However, deal-making boards are more likely to rely upon 
measures of CEO non-financial performance to justify pay 
raises. (e) 
O'Reilly, Main, and 
Crystal, 1988; ASQ 
SC, Anchoring, 
Tournament 
C Strong support for social comparison and anchoring 
theories, with compensation committee member pay 
associated with CEO compensation. No support for 
tournament theory in predicting CEO compensation. 
Perry and 
Zenner, 2001; JFE 
  C Compensation committees consider the regulatory 
environment when making CEO compensation decisions. 
For Theoretical Frame: (MP) Managerial Power Theory, (SC) Social Comparison Theory, (SN) Social Networking 
Theory, (SOC) Standard Optimal Contracting Theory, (UE) Upper Echelons Theory. 
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (N) Nominating. 
Table 6. Outcomes: Misconduct and inappropriate behavior 
Authors, Year; Journal Theoretical 
frame 
Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if 
endogeneity was addressed in methods) 
Committee 
independence 
   
Bebchuk, Grinstein, and 
Peyer, 2010; JOF 
  C An independent compensation committee alone does not 
reduce likelihood of the receipt of lucky stock option grants. 
However, the presence of at least one large blockholder on 
an independent compensation committee reduces the 
likelihood of opportunistic timing of option grants by 71%. 
Bedard, Chtourou, and 
Courteau, 2004; AJPT 
Agency A Financial expertise constrain aggressive earnings 
management. Strong negative relationship for audit 
committee member independence with excluding stock 
options from compensation and aggressive earnings 
management. No relationship found for audit committee 
activity and earnings management. (e) 
Brochet and 
Srinivasan, 2014; JFE 
  A Independent directors on the audit committee have a 
greater likelihood of being named a defendant in a class 
action lawsuit than directors not on the audit committee. (e) 
Bruynseels and 
Cardinaels, 2013; TAR 
Agency, SN A Audit committees with friendship-related social network ties 
to the CEO purchase fewer audit services, engage in more 
earnings management, and are less likely to issue going-
concern opinions or report internal control weaknesses. 
Social ties between audit committee members and CEOs that 
were formed from advice networks do not influence the 
quality of audit committee oversight. (e) 
Callaghan, Saly, and 
Subramaniam, 2004; 
JOF 
  C Percentage of insiders on compensation committee 
negatively related to option repricing and is a more 
important predictor than percentage of insiders on the full 
board or insider stock ownership. Presence of a blockholder 
on the compensation committee reduces likelihood of 
repricing, while the presence of a nonexecutive chairman on 
the compensation committee increases likelihood of 
repricing. 
Carcello and 
Neal, 2000; TAR 
Agency A A greater percentage of affiliated directors on the audit 
committee reduces the likelihood of the firm's auditor 
issuing a going-concern report. 
Felo, 2001; JBE Agency C Ratio of insiders on compensation committee positively 
related to firm not having an ethics program. 
Klein, 2002a; TAR Agency A Audit committees with less than 50% independent directors 
associated with larger adjusted abnormal accruals. 
Movement to a minority-independent audit committee 
associated with large increases in adjusted abnormal 
accruals. (e) 
Krishnan, 2005; TAR Agency A Audit committee independence and financial expertise on 
the audit committee negatively associated with internal 
control problems. 
Larcker, Richardson, 
and Tuna, 2007; TAR 
  A No relationships between affiliated directors on the audit 
committee and number of audit committee meetings with 
abnormal accruals, earnings restatements, and future 
performance. (e) 
Schnatterly, 2003; SMJ Agency A Greater levels of audit committee independence and 
meetings are not related to the likelihood of a first crime, but 
may help prevent subsequent crimes. 
Uzun, Szewczyk, and 
Varma, 2004; FAJ 
Agency A, C, 
N 
The presence of an audit committee was negatively 
associated with fraud, but presence of a compensation 
committee and grey directors on major committees was 
positively associated with fraud. 
Committee 
composition 
   
Beasley, 1996; TAR Agency A Outside director ratio associated with lower financial 
statement fraud. Audit committee presence (pre-SOX) and 
its interaction with the ratio of outside directors not 
associated with financial statement fraud. 
Cao, Dhaliwal, Li, and 
Yang, 2014; MS 
SN A, C, 
N 
Directors on the nominating or compensation committee 
receive higher than average returns from stock purchases 
than other directors, while there is no such advantage for 
directors on the audit committee. (e) 
DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1991; TAR 
  A Presence of an audit committee (pre-SOX) negatively 
associated with overstated earnings. 
Naiker and 
Sharma, 2009; TAR 
Revolving 
Door 
A Former audit partners on the audit committee, regardless of 
affiliation with the firm's current auditor, are negatively 
related to the reporting of internal control deficiencies. (e) 
Committee 
characteristics 
   
Ndofor, Wesley, and 
Priem, 2015; JOM 
Agency, 
Complexity 
A The relationship of industry and firm complexity with 
fraudulent reporting is negatively moderated by more 
stringent audit committee monitoring. (e) 
Badolato, Donelson, 
and Ege, 2014; JAE 
Agency A Audit committees with higher status and financial expertise 
are associated with lower accounting irregularities and 
abnormal accruals. (e) 
Chan, Chen, Chen, and 
Yu, 2012; JAE 
  A There is a positive relationship between audit committee size 
and clawback adoption. 
Farber, 2005; TAR Agency A Fraudulent firms associated with fewer audit committee 
meetings and financial experts on audit committee. Firms 
adjusting governance to findings of fraud have more audit 
committee meetings. 
Keune and 
Johnstone, 2012; TAR 
ED, ARP A Negative relationship found for audit committees with 
greater financial expertise with likelihood of waiving material 
misstatements. 
For Theoretical Frame: (ARP) Auditor Reputation Protection, (ED) Economic Dependence, (SN) Social Networking 
Theory. 
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (N) Nominating. 





Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if 
endogeneity was addressed in methods) 
Committee 
independence 
   
Abbott et 
al., 2004; AJPT 
  A Likelihood of restatement is less for firms with fully independent 
and more active audit committees who include a financial 
expert. (e) 
Abbott et 
al., 2003; AJPT 
  A Audit committee independence and inclusion of financial 
expertise are positively associated with audit fees. (e) 
Carcello and 
Neal, 2003: TAR 
Agency A Audit committee independence, governance expertise and 
member stock ownership positively related retaining an auditor 
after issuance of an unfavourable report. Auditor dismissal 
positively related to subsequent audit committee member 
turnover. 
Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005; JAR 
Agency A Managers in firms with more effective audit committee 
structures (e.g., higher ratio of independent members, larger 
size, more frequent meetings, and higher ratio of financial 
experts) more likely to make or update earnings forecasts. 
Forecasts in firms with more effective audit committee 
structures likely to have less precise, but more accurate 
forecasts, and more likely to result in a positive market reaction. 
Committee 
composition 
   
Cohen et 
al., 2013; TAR 
RD A Audit committees with more members who are both accounting 
and industry experts perform better than audit committees with 
just accounting experts, or, in some cases, audit committees 
with only financial supervisory expertise. (e) 
Gaynor et 
al., 2006; TAR 
Agency A Audit committee members more likely to have joint provision 
preferences similar to investors if audit quality improves and 
more reluctant than investors to recommend joint provisions 
when public disclosures are required. 
Hoitash et 
al., 2009; TAR 
Agency A Number of audit committee meetings, but not audit committee 
size, positively associated with material weaknesses disclosed. 
(e) 
Knapp, 1987; TAR Exchange A Audit committee members more likely to support auditors, 
instead of management, during audit disputes. Audit committee 
member less likely to support the auditor when disputes were 
not related to technical standards or when the firm is in a strong 
financial position. 
Naiker et 
al. 2012; TAR 
  A Former audit firm partners, regardless of affiliation, on the audit 
committee reduce non-audit services purchased from the 
auditor. 
Venkataraman, et 
al. 2008; TAR 
  A In pre-IPO situations, the presence of an audit committee is 
negatively associated with accruals. 
Committee 
characteristics 
   
Abbott et al. 
, 2007; TAR 
  A Firms with effective audit committees less likely to outsource 
routine internal auditing to an external auditor, while no such 
relationship was found for outsourcing non-routine audit 
activity. 
Agoglia et al2011; 
TAR 
  A The relationship between the CFO applying a more precise 
standard with the likelihood of aggressive financial reporting 




Power, Agency A More powerful audit committees were associated with smaller 
audit fee reductions, while more powerful CFOs were associated 
with larger audit fee reductions. (e) 





A Audit committee members' total compensation and cash 







A Level of inside director ownership negatively associated with 
audit committee legitimacy. Outside directors on the board 
positively associated with audit committee legitimacy. 
Krishna et 
al., 2011; TAR 
Agency A Legal expertise on audit committee positively related to financial 
reporting quality. Positive effects of legal expertise combined 
with accounting expertise on the audit committee are greater 
after SOX. (e) 
Leventis et 
al., 2013; CGIR 
  A Banks with effective board and audit committee governance 
structures recognize larger loan loss provisions on 
nonperforming loans compared to banks with ineffective 
governance structures. (e) 
Magilk et 
al., 2009; TAR 
Agency A Audit committee members prefer aggressive financial reporting 
when compensated with current stock and overly conservative 
reporting when compensated with future stock. Audit 
committee members with no stock-based compensation are the 
most objective. 
Seabright et 
al., 1992; AMJ 
SE A Tenure of the relationships between audit committee members 
and auditor is negatively associated with the likelihood that the 
firm switches auditors. 
For Theoretical Frame: (RD) Resource Dependence Theory, (SE) Social Exchange Theory 
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit. 





Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if 
endogeneity was addressed in methods) 
Anderson et 
al., 2004; JAE 
Agency A Audit committee independence is associated with lower cost of 
debt financing. Audit committee size and number of audit 




Agency C CEOs may opportunistically reduce R&D spending when they 
approach retirement or their firm faces a small earnings decline. 
Compensation committees make changes in CEO option 





  A Replacement of audit committee members leads to higher 




  N Noncompliant firms forced to raise board independence or adopt 
a fully independent nominating committee significantly increase 
their forced CEO turnover sensitivity to performance relative to 
compliant firms. Effect of nominating committee independence 
stronger when CEO was previously on the committee. Board and 
nominating committee independence associated with more 
effective CEO monitoring and discipline. (e) 
Ng and 




A The availability of guidance from the audit committee has a 
stronger effect on the potential for not meeting analysts’ 
expectations when the audit committee is not effective. 
Stevenson and 
Radin, 2009; JMS 
Agency, Social 
Capital, SN 
A, C Serving on the compensation committee associated with greater 
influence on overall board decision-making. No relationship 





N Presence of an independent nominating committee at the time 
of succession reduces the likelihood of new CEO dismissal. When 
outside directors have fewer external directorships, the 
likelihood of new CEO dismissal is lower in firms with a 
nominating committee. 
For Theoretical Frame: (SN) Social Networking Theory. 
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (N) Nominating. 
Table 9. Findings related to less traditional committees 
Authors, Year; Journal Theoretical 
frame 
Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if 




   
Berrone and Gomez-
Mejia, 2009; AMJ 
Institutional, 
Agency 
E Firms with an environmental committee do not reward 
CEOs with environmental strategies more than CEOs 
without environmental strategies. (e) 
Davidson and 
Worrell, 2001; B&S 
Institutional, 
Configurational 
E Presence of an environmental committee positively 
associated with reduced industry fines. Companies in 
‘dirtier’ industries are less likely to have an 
environmental board committee. 
Eccles et al., 2014; MS Stakeholder E High sustainability companies are more likely to form 
board committees on sustainability 
McKendall et al., 1999; 
IJOA 




The presence of an ethics, public policy, or corporate 
social responsibility committee is not related to 
environmental violations. 




A, E For environmental committees, presence, size, number 
of meetings and expertise of its members positively 
associated with likelihood of a greenhouse gas 
disclosure. Committee size associated with lower 
transparency. Overlap of board members serving on 
the audit and environmental committees positively 
associated with likelihood of greenhouse gas 
disclosure. (e) 




Presence of an environmental committee is positively 
related to environmental performance. 
Presence of non‐
required committees 
   
Beekun et al.,1998; JOM Agency SP The presence of a strategic planning committee is 
negatively related to emphasis on financial outcomes 
in CEO evaluation. (e) 
Gore et al., 2011; SMJ Agency F Presence of a finance committee is negatively 
associated with annual CFO equity incentives and the 
proportion of compensation comprised of equity. (e) 
Henke, 1986; JBS   SP Presence of a strategic planning committee correlates 
with management participation and breadth of 




  T Firms’ corporate governance ratings and performance 
(ROA, ROE, margin) are positively related to voluntary 
decisions to form technology committees. 
Outcomes from non‐
required committees 
   
Fracassi and Tate, 2012; 
JOF 
  Ex, 
PA 
Connected directors more likely to serve on the 
executive committee. Merger and acquisition activity 
more frequent when executive committee contains 
connected directors. Firm value decreases more from 
connectivity of executive committee members than 
from connectivity of board members. (e) 
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (Ex) Executive, (CSR) Corporate Social 
Responsibility, (E) Environmental, (Eth) Ethics, (F) Finance, (PA) Public Affairs, (PP) Public Policy (SP) Strategic 
Planning, (T) Technology. 
 
However, the use of other theoretical perspectives has varied widely across disciplines. In our review, we found 
that management has taken the most diverse approach, with agency theory being the chosen framework in 
approximately 35 per cent of the studies reviewed in which a theoretical frame was identified. Institutional 
theory and, relatedly, social networking theory have been used by management scholars, especially when 
examining committee existence and membership. Resource dependence has also been used in management 
studies, but to a lesser extent in recent years. Additionally, management scholars have used a variety of other 
behavioural theoretical lenses, including social comparison theory and economic perspectives such as human 
capital theory. 
Finance, in contrast, is even more heavily focused on agency theory; around 75 per cent of board committee 
studies in finance stating a theoretical frame used agency theory. Some studies have drawn heavily from other 
economic perspectives (e.g., contracting, bargaining power, human capital theory). Still, finance scholars 
examining board committees tend to cluster work around basic economic ideas with little influence from 
organization theory (e.g., resource dependence, institutional theory) or behavioural decision-making 
frameworks (e.g., equity theory, social comparison theory). 
Accounting scholars fall somewhere between management and finance scholars, with agency theory being used 
in a little more than 60 per cent of the studies of board committees that stated a theoretical framework. While 
accounting scholars have primarily used other economics-based theories in addition to agency theory, important 
accounting studies of board committees have been published using resource dependence and social networking 
theory, as well as several other behavioural decision-making approaches. 
In terms of antecedents and outcomes of board committees, accounting scholars dominate published research 
on audit committees and how accounting practices are affected by board committee composition and 
characteristics, but have shown little interest in how committee members are selected. Management and 
finance scholars have shown a substantial and fairly equal focus on firm performance and executive 
compensation as major outcomes influenced by board committee characteristics. All three disciplines have been 
interested in examining how board committees may affect misconduct or illegal actions by firm managers. 
An Agenda for Future Research on Board Committees 
Based on our review of board committee research, we identified several areas in which existing research can be 
extended or enhanced by using new theoretical perspectives or methodological approaches. In this section, we 
provide recommendations by outlining three broad areas for moving board committee research 
forward: revisiting established topics with different approaches and theories, studying underexplored 
areas, and methodological improvements. An overview of this recommended research agenda is provided in 
Figure 2. We first begin by discussing some of the most promising areas for theoretical enhancement, such as 
examining the role of director human and social capital and diversity and dynamics among committee members. 
While these approaches have been applied at the level of the entire board, they are scarce in board committee 
research. 
 
Figure 2 Agenda for future board committee research 
Revisiting Established Topics with Different Approaches and Theories 
Director human and social capital 
Board level research illustrates the importance of directors’ human capital (i.e., knowledge, skills and 
experience; Becker, 1994) and social capital (i.e., personal networks with associated reciprocity; Lin, 2017), 
though it can be difficult to distinguish between human and social capital (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). Research 
suggests that to perform its monitoring and resource provisioning functions appropriately, directors must have 
the necessary combination of human and social capital (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Withers et al., 2012). While 
these influences are important at the board level (e.g., Johnson et al., 2013), committees exist for distinct 
purposes and directors’ human and social capital associated with those purposes may serve an even more 
essential role. However, the value of such capital to a committee is likely to be bounded by the nature of 
committees’ tasks. For instance, the audit committee requires extensive monitoring by directors to maintain the 
independence of the external auditor and examine financial statement accuracy (Carcello et al., 2011). Thus, a 
director's accounting skills and financial reporting expertise, combined with prior experience working for or with 
an external auditor, contribute to the quality of monitoring by the audit committee. However, other aspects of 
human and social capital (e.g., experience in mergers and acquisitions) may be valuable to the board, but would 
be of little value to the audit committee. 
As such, an avenue for future research is to explore whether director human and social capital transfers to all 
committees conditioned on the nature of the committee's purpose. Given the primary monitoring role played by 
the audit committee, human capital should have a stronger influence on its effectiveness (Carcello et al., 2011), 
something recognized by capital markets when directors with accounting expertise are appointed (Davidson et 
al., 2004). At the same time, social capital, particularly ties to executives within the firm, may dampen audit 
committee effectiveness by making directors more sympathetic to management and reducing the quality of 
oversight. Social capital, however, may be of utmost importance to nominating committees, where directors are 
tasked with finding high quality future directors and recruiting them to the board (Eminet and Guedri, 2010). In 
the middle, the compensation committee's focus on executive compensation and, in many cases, executive 
succession planning, may leverage both human and social capital. On the one hand, the compensation 
committee is tasked with limiting managerial opportunism through rent-seeking, requiring social capital, 
experience, and other facets of human capital to identify such behaviour. At the same time, social comparison 
theory suggests that social capital might lead to increases in CEO compensation (Belliveau et al., 1996). 
As a whole, the value of director capital is likely to be reflected differently at the committee level than it is at the 
board level. When monitoring or advice are necessary, human capital is likely to take a prominent role. When 
the focus is placed on resource provisioning or accessing external parties, social capital is likely to be more 
important. Research can examine whether committees perform better based on the accumulated capital 
brought by directors and whether this capital matches the requirements of the committee, as well as the 
specific types of capital that influence the committee's effectiveness in accomplishing its purpose. 
One final important aspect of committee functioning is the relevance of a director's human or social capital to 
the committee. Compared to employed executives, retired executives bring a wealth of knowledge to boards 
that is more readily available (Platt and Platt, 2012). As such, retired executives may serve in a more meaningful 
manner by being available for counsel. This experience, however, is only valuable to the extent that it is relevant 
in the firm's context. While retired executives may be more involved, their contributions may be based on 
obsolete knowledge or relationships. For instance, such directors on the compensation committee may make 
incomplete social comparisons (see Belliveau et al., 1996). Research could examine the effect of retired 
executive directors on committee performance, particularly when potentially obsolete human or social capital 
could influence committee effectiveness. Of course, scholars examining this question should acknowledge that 
retired executives serving as board members have more available time to serve on committees compared to 
other board members. 
Diversity and dynamics among committee members and across contexts 
In our review, we show that an oft-studied aspect of board composition is the degree of diversity or dissimilarity 
among board members along different dimensions, such as gender, race, or functional background. At the level 
of the entire board, scholars have found that different types of director diversity may constrain strategic change 
(Goodstein et al., 1994; Tasheva and Hillman, in press), but also increase firm value (Carter et al., 2003) and 
performance (Erhardt et al., 2003). 
Management research, however, illustrates that differences among directors can become problematic when 
they create faultlines between factions due to social categorization processes which yield conflict and cause 
disruptions through the creation of schisms among directors (Veltrop et al., 2015). Faultlines exist when there 
are categorizations, primarily based on demographics, which might lead directors to group themselves into 
smaller subgroups. While faultline research is nascent at the board level, we believe it has important 
implications at the committee level for two reasons. First, the effects of faultlines on group performance may be 
exacerbated within smaller groups like board committees. Strong faultlines require homogeneity within 
subgroups (Lau and Murnighan, 1998), which is unlikely across multiple attributes in larger groups (Hart and Van 
Vugt, 2006). Second, board committees are more deeply focused on specific topics, requiring greater attention 
and discussion on contentious issues. Deep divides are more likely to breed conflict, which is also enhanced by 
faultlines (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). This does not indicate the entire board is immune to conflict, but rather 
suggests that such contentious issues (e.g., dismissing a CEO) are less likely to arise on a routine basis. 
Exploring committee faultlines is potentially illuminating, since it can highlight mechanisms through which 
director diversity may not translate to performance. Boards may not consider director characteristics, traits and 
experience when determining committee membership, creating faultlines in committees. Given that faultlines 
often lead to conflict and reduced task satisfaction (Thatcher and Patel, 2012), committee faultlines may lead to 
member turnover or disengagement in activities particularly critical for the organization, hampering committee 
effectiveness. Research might also explore how committee composition changes influence potential faultline 
shifts and, subsequently, committee effectiveness. New committee members can be brought on to break up 
existing subgroups, replace a departed subgroup member, or reinforce existing subgroups (Thatcher and 
Patel, 2012). Changes in committee membership may have a significant influence on the working relationships 
among committee members going forward. As boards increase diversity, it is important to understand how 
diversity's effects might be leveraged differently at the committee level. 
Relatedly, recently published theory associated with boards and corporate governance has predicted that 
diversity across individuals (i.e., team diversity) and the ranges of diversity within individuals (i.e., personal 
diversity) may be the missing link when attempting to understand the how diversity influences team outcomes 
(Tasheva and Hillman, in press). Such arguments suggest that team diversity may be overstated if the overlap of 
non-dominant backgrounds or network ties among team members is not considered (Zhu et al., 2014). However, 
Tasheva and Hillman theorize that, within boards, team and personal diversity may act as substitutes or 
complements to one another, and that the need for collaboration to fulfil tasks determines whether they act as 
such. Integrated with or independent from a study of faultlines in board committees, examining team and 
personal diversity not only at the board level, but also at the committee level may bring an entirely new 
perspective of when and where diversity provides the most value. 
Infusion of new theoretical perspectives 
As noted earlier, our review shows committee level research has drawn heavily on agency theory (70 out of 142 
studies), with most research emphasizing independence and diligent monitoring. Since director responsibilities 
have expanded over time, we believe board committee research needs more extensive application of other 
management theories, including resource dependence, upper echelons, and institutional and network theories, 
to gain a more detailed picture of a committee's role in governance. Indeed, the virtual disappearance of 
insiders on most boards over the last two decades calls into question how to examine independence from an 
agency theory approach (more on this point later). 
Board-level research integrating multiple theoretical perspectives has been the catalyst for developing new 
board-level theories (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2018; Hambrick et al., 2015), as well as serving as the foundation for 
new findings associated with board membership and the board's monitoring and resource provisioning functions 
(e.g., Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2008). Integrating management theories with agency theory may 
provide a better understanding of the rationale for appointing certain directors to committees and how those 
committees help firms adapt to their environment. For example, are directors more likely to become committee 
members due to their monitoring and counselling skills (resource dependence theory), friendship ties to existing 
directors (network theory), or individual characteristics (upper echelons perspective)? Furthermore, we envision 
scholars utilizing network theory to examine whether committee members use their network status to gain 
power and how that power translates into committee decisions. Are higher-status committee members likely to 
exercise their power across all committee decisions or selectively dominate key committee decisions? Do high 
status directors influence board appointments, thus further enabling a small network of corporate elites? 
As we have argued in the previous pages, we believe that future progress will come through theories that either 
complement or compete with agency theory approaches to board committees. Within resource dependence 
theory, examining the human and social capital of board committee members will likely yield new insights, but 
will also require the understanding and measurement of director experiences, expertise and social connections. 
Likewise, we expect group dynamics research to play a stronger role in future studies. Because board 
committees are relatively small in size, dysfunctional relationships between several members could have a 
disproportionate effect on the committee's performance of its duties. 
Studying Underexplored Areas 
In the following sections, we provide further suggestions for different topics to be explored within new or 
enhanced theoretical frameworks. 
Additional predictors of board committee composition 
In our review, we discuss research findings on factors influencing committee composition. While director human 
capital, independence, demographic characteristics and behaviour predict committee composition, we envision 
a greater and more diverse set of predictors. Firm strategic direction, resource requirements, and director social 
capital may serve as important predictors of committee membership. One research opportunity is to examine 
how restructuring activities, including acquisitions, mergers and divestitures, impact board committee 
composition. Since these activities are associated with significant structural and executive changes in the firm 
(Haleblian et al., 2009), such changes may also reach board committees. For example, how likely and under what 
conditions are a target firm's directors invited to serve on committees in the acquiring firm? Drawing on group 
diversity research, we could expect that an acquiring firm's strong culture of inclusiveness (Chatman et al., 1998; 
Hopkins and Hopkins, 2002) positively impacts the addition of target firm directors to the acquiring firm's board 
committees. An equally important research question relates to understanding how dynamics within committees 
are impacted by the addition of target firm directors and how such new members are integrated. We speculate 
that the addition of target firm directors could initially yield relational conflict, limiting cohesion (Horwitz and 
Horwitz, 2007), but may also bring more diverse perspectives for comprehensive decision making. 
In addition, we envision the application of resource dependence and network theory to examine how a 
director's experiences, expertise and social ties predict committee membership. For example, we speculate that 
current or former members of leading executive compensation consulting firms have strong credentials and are 
perceived as highly relevant additions to the compensation committee. Similarly, a current or former CEO who 
has led a successful turnaround may be a highly-sought addition for a newly formed strategic planning 
committee, since he or she can enhance a committee's and firm's credibility. Additionally, examining whether 
politicians, due to their social connections, fame and experience, are more likely to chair a firm's governance 
committee would be thought-provoking and valuable, as well as shedding light on whether political connections 
can bring valuable resources to the board and its committees within various contexts. These research 
opportunities can examine matches between committee functions and the skills and resources needed to 
perform those functions. 
Haynes and Hillman (2010) also found positive effects from directors’ cumulative human capital breadth and 
negative effects from cumulative human capital depth on firm outcomes. As board committees have more 
focused objectives, future research that extends Haynes and Hillman's work to the committee level could yield 
valuable insights regarding the right mix of experience, functional expertise and networking for committees to 
meet their objectives. 
Finally, prior research has not addressed how director turnover influences committee composition. Given 
committees’ small size, the turnover of one member not only changes a committee's configuration, but may also 
alter committee dynamics and functioning. For example, if an audit committee member retires from the board, 
general and firm-specific financial knowledge may be lost and the power dynamics within the audit committee 
may be dramatically changed. In such cases, does the board prioritize hiring a replacement with similar 
functional background and experience, a similar demographic background, a close relationship with the 
remaining audit committee members, or a replacement who brings a different skillset and unique expertise and 
experience? In a broader sense, research is needed to understand the influence of the nominating committee 
and its members on the demographics, skills and experience of new board and committee members. 
Focus on less traditional committees 
As our review revealed, the bulk of research has been centred on the three major committees, as only 11 of the 
142 articles examined less traditional committees. Greater attention can be given to less traditional committees, 
examining why they exist and the degree to which they influence various processes and firm outcomes. Given 
the rising importance of CSR and increases in shareholder activism, we envision a positive relationship between 
CSR-related shareholder proposals and the formation of CSR committees. Furthermore, this relationship should 
be stronger when shareholder activists have greater experience with prior campaigns and when firms exhibit, or 
the media reports them as having, CSR violations. 
Changes in societal norms or perceptions could be an important driver for the emergence of less traditional 
committees. For example, recent revelations of sexual misconduct and harassment might force firms to create 
committees responsible for the implementation and enforcement of equal treatment and protection of 
employees. We speculate that the announcement of such committees would be perceived positively by the 
market only when their purpose is not perceived by stakeholders as impression management. 
Board-level factors are also likely to impact the emergence and purpose of less traditional committees. Using a 
finance committee as an example, it would be interesting to test the following competing hypotheses: the 
presence of directors with financial expertise is positively associated with the formation of a finance committee 
and, alternatively, weak financial expertise on the board is positively associated with the formation of a financial 
committee. The first hypothesis argues that greater expertise in a specific function drives formalized structures 
associated with that function, while the latter hypothesis argues that formal structure is used to overcome 
functional weaknesses. 
Because the vast majority of large firms in English common law countries have compensation, 
nominating/governance, and audit committees, less traditional committees might offer a fruitful setting for 
testing resource dependence versus institutional theory as a driver of committee existence. If a firm's strategy or 
industry creates crucial resource contingencies, specialized committees might develop from that dependence. 
For example, firms that use a substantial amount of clean water for operations may be more likely to have 
environmental board committees. In contrast to such an explanation, environmental committees may be more 
likely to be established when the firm's board has interlocks to other firms with environmental committees. This 
suggests an institutional theory explanation in which the presence of board committees is motivated by a need 
for legitimacy (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Such research could extend to a number of less traditional 
board committees. 
Interactions between various committees 
As shown in our cross-disciplinary review, most research has examined committees in isolation and overlooked 
interactions between committees and their members. One way to increase focus on this topic is to draw on the 
idea of complementary versus substitute governance mechanisms (e.g., Misangyi and Acharya, 2014) and 
examine if and when different board committees serve as substitutes or complements. For example, what is the 
interplay between the nominating and compensation committees and its impact on firm performance? Is it 
sufficient to have an independent nominating committee that is responsible for appointing the ‘right’ CEO and 
directors to guide the firm? Alternatively, an independent nominating committee may be necessary but not 
sufficient, with firms also needing a vigilant compensation committee that complements the nominating 
committee and ensures that a new CEO's compensation structure incentivizes value maximization. Furthermore, 
recent studies drawing on fuzzy set methodology have shown that performance is influenced simultaneously by 
multiple governance factors that operate as complex configurations (e.g., Misangyi and Acharya, 2014). Applying 
this logic to committees, scholars need to consider committee characteristics, such as size, composition, tenure, 
and expertise, as a configuration when examining their association with firm performance and other outcomes. 
Another important committee phenomenon is directors who simultaneously serve on multiple committees. 
Such common membership is characterized by complex dynamics and interactions among directors. For 
example, Brandes et al. (2016) found that directors serving simultaneously on audit and compensation 
committees act as important conduits for knowledge transfer between directors’ monitoring and incentive 
alignment duties, leading to lower executive compensation. In contrast, Liao and Hsu (2013) find that common 
committee membership can make directors too busy, resulting in poorer earnings quality and reduced CEO pay-
performance sensitivity. These conflicting results indicate that further research into common membership is 
needed to determine whether the benefits of knowledge transfer outweigh the drawbacks of busyness (e.g., 
Ferris et al., 2003). A contingency perspective might bring better understanding to this question. For example, 
directors of firms in industries with greater uncertainty and unpredictability could face additional cognitive 
pressures that might overwhelm and further distract them, reducing their ability to effectively contribute to 
multiple committees. 
Further, the characteristics of such directors may influence their effectiveness. Retired directors may have 
additional time to devote to the firm, reducing problems associated with busyness. Alternatively, busyness may 
be a substantial problem if a director is a sitting CEO of another firm and has membership on multiple 
committees. Moreover, overlap might be particularly important for some critical board functions. For instance, 
CEO succession planning may be the purview of multiple committees: the nominating committee identifies, 
evaluates and hires new directors and ensures they buy into the importance of succession planning, while the 
compensation committee provides incentives to attract, develop and retain high potential executives. 
Ultimately, committees may have responsibilities geared toward accomplishing a common goal and coordinating 
activities among them may be critical to achieving that objective. 
Finally, future research on common committee membership could focus on the degree to which committee 
interlocks create potentially harmful isomorphism. An influential director serving on multiple committees may 
compel each committee to function too similarly or frame issues and potential directions in the same manner. 
To the degree that committees help drive the firm forward through in-depth discussion and a focus on key 
issues, interlocks may reduce the firm's ability to adapt and consider alternative directions in a meaningful 
fashion. 
Interactions of committees with the full corporate board 
From our review of the literature, another area with negligible prior research is the interactions between 
committees and the full board. A key feature of board committees is their ability to utilize specialized knowledge 
and skills (Kesner, 1988), which allows them to perform specific tasks more efficiently and effectively than the 
full board. Since committees play an integral and complementary role to the full board, it is important for future 
research to provide a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the relationships and interactions 
between board committees and the full board. 
Expertise and experience deserve further attention, examining the interaction of their specialized nature at the 
committee level and their general nature at the board level. For example, how does nominating committee 
expertise interact with other directors’ expertise to identify director candidates? While we can expect a positive 
relationship between nominating committee social capital and appointing prestigious directors, we speculate 
that other directors’ interlocks and network connections (e.g., their social capital) strengthen the relationship. 
We believe it is also important to examine fit between structural characteristics, such as independence, of 
committees and the full board. While it is logical to expect that committee independence interacts with board 
independence to constrain managerial self-serving behaviour and enhance firm performance, it would be 
interesting to examine how committee independence and lack of board independence impact firm performance. 
Can committee independence compensate for the lack of overall board independence? If true, such research 
can offer a new understanding of the equivocal findings on the effectiveness of board independence on firm 
performance (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998). It would also be interesting to examine the interaction of additional 
governance mechanisms, such as equity ownership. For example, is the compensation committee's equity 
ownership sufficient to constrain CEO total compensation and ensure CEO pay-performance sensitivity, or does 
the compensation committee's equity ownership need to be paired with the full board's equity ownership for 
shareholder value maximization? 
Finally, the nested structure of committees within corporate boards is associated with directors having multiple 
work-related identities (e.g., Johnson et al., 2006). Audit committee members, for example, associate 
themselves with the accounting and finance professions, with the audit committee, and with the firm's board. 
Given that identities can shape behaviour and the salience of a particular identity is dependent on the 
surrounding context (Ashforth, 2000; Hillman et al., 2008), directors might exhibit different behaviours 
dependent on the role that they are currently serving. When a director is performing audit committee functions, 
he or she might focus on specific details regarding reporting accuracy (i.e., ‘the trees’). However, in full board 
meetings, the same director might stress the importance of long-range planning and strategy (i.e., ‘the forest’). 
How might these multiple identities and potential identity conflicts impact the overall effectiveness of directors 
and their contribution to firm value creation? Overall, we believe that utilizing multi-level analysis for committee 
and board research could enhance understanding their complex and multi-faceted nature and relationships. 
Board committees and directors' power 
Prior work has also extensively examined committees’ impact on board decision-making processes and 
organizational outcomes. In doing so, scholars have primarily focused on the committee as a level of analysis 
and relied on aggregating directors’ characteristics to theorize how and when committees are more likely to 
exercise power. While research advances our understanding of committees’ role in governing the firm, it has left 
many unanswered questions about the power of committee members. 
For example, committee chairs are likely to have greater power than other committee members, as the 
committee chair sets its agenda. Therefore, constructs often examined at the committee level, such as human or 
social capital through board interlocks, should be examined at the committee chair level. The committee chair's 
power may be enough to affect the firm regardless of the other members’ characteristics, rendering other 
directors’ capital moot. 
Future research could study how directors’ power associated with major committee membership is perceived by 
CEOs. Do CEOs try to limit the power of major board committee chairs and, if so, in what ways? One covert 
approach to undermine power is to push for the appointment of diverse and conflict-prone directors who 
oppose and disagree with the committee chair, inhibiting committee social integration (see O'Reilly et al., 1989). 
Relatedly, what do CEOs do when they disagree with a major committee's decision? While, in some cases, CEOs 
may adapt to such a decision, they may also seek to control processes, not due to opportunism, but because 
they have better information. Additionally, if CEOs anticipate conflicts with a committee and its members, do 
they focus on developing relationships with committee members or do they seek ways to place similar or more 
supportive directors on that committee? 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine how director turnover is affected by the power stemming from 
committee membership. Do directors on lower-status and voluntary committees turn over more than directors 
on higher-status, mandatory committees? On one hand, higher-status committees are more visible, and their 
mistakes and ineffective decisions are more likely to lead to external pressure for members to resign (Arthaud-
Day et al., 2006). On the other hand, higher-status committees garner more power for members to withstand 
such pressure. 
Addressing these questions associated with CEO and director power creates a challenge for scholars. Utilizing 
established board capital measures, such as functional categories (see Hillman et al., 2000) and measuring 
directors’ industry embeddedness, expertise and interlocks (see Haynes and Hillman, 2010), may begin to 
address challenges at the committee level. Archival measures of CEO (see Finkelstein, 1992) and director power 
(see Westphal and Zajac, 1995) may also be beneficial for examining committee member power. However, if 
scholars are going to better understand power in committees, or how CEO power may or may not overcome a 
powerful committee chair, we recommend the development of new scales and interview methodologies. We 
endorse an updated version of scales developed by Pearce and Zahra (1991) that focus on ethics, process, style 
and effectiveness of committees. Scholars would then interview committee members during their available time 
when the board is meeting. 
A more comprehensive view of independence 
The predominance of independent boards post-SOX may have made research examining board independence 
somewhat obsolete (Joseph et al., 2014). However, it has also opened up avenues for new research examining 
different director characteristics (Krause et al., 2013). Indeed, the role of independence in committee 
composition and function is a rich topic for employing more refined predictors of committee membership with 
an emphasis on professional affiliations and social connections. 
We found that 34 studies operationalized independence in our review, yet only 13 studies used samples that 
spanned pre- and post-SOX enactment in 2002, and only four studies used samples solely after SOX. Studies 
using samples prior to SOX often applied simpler measures of independence, such as no relationship with 
management (e.g., Callahan et al., 2003) or the majority of directors on the committee having not been 
employed by the firm (e.g., Krishnan, 2005). For research utilizing samples partially or fully after SOX, we see 
greater consideration of all types of prior and current relationships and affiliations. Bruynseels and Cardinaels 
(2013), for instance, considered social network ties between audit committee members and the CEO, finding 
that such ties influence the firm's financial reporting behaviour, while Hwang and Kim (2009) utilized an 
extensive array of possible social linkages between audit committee members and CEOs in a pre- and post-SOX 
sample, finding that CEOs receive larger bonuses when audit committees, despite being conventionally 
independent, are socially linked. 
Future research that more extensively captures committee members’ expertise and histories, with an emphasis 
on past personal and professional relationships, offers the opportunity to bridge social networking and social 
exchange theories with agency theory to offer fresh, wide-ranging insights regarding committee members 
meeting their fiduciary duties. Additionally, committee members’ alignment with the current CEO may also 
influence their execution of fiduciary duties. Prior research offers evidence that directors without any formal ties 
to the firm may refrain from independent decision making due to social and other relational ties with the CEO 
(Westphal and Graebner, 2010). We recommend future studies that consider the breadth of social dependence 
and how various ties and connections (e.g., joint membership in clubs and associations, graduation from the 
same university cohort) influence a committee's ability to perform its duties. 
We also encourage a far greater examination of board member longevity and independence. An examination of 
interdependence, in which directors are conventionally independent but began serving as director after the CEO 
started in his or her position (see Dalton et al., 1998), may improve scholarly understanding of whether CEOs are 
able to choose more sympathetic directors and how those directors influence committee outcomes. 
Alternatively, long-serving board members may have a strong familiarity with firm strategies and operations or 
may have developed close relationships with firm executives and other board members. Future studies 
examining whether committee member longevity and ability to act independently may help scholars resolve 
previous ambiguous findings, such as those associated with the relationship of committee independence and 
CEO compensation (e.g., Faulkender and Yang, 2010). 
Only a handful of studies consider the effects of ownership among committee members on committee 
composition and outcomes, with research largely centred on blockholders on committees (e.g., Bebchuk et 
al., 2010; Callaghan et al., 2004; Yermack, 1997). Future research could draw from power theories to explore 
whether directors with greater equity ownership are more likely to gain influence on certain committees. For 
instance, a director who holds more equity may be more likely to become committee chair and, thus, control 
the agenda. Exploratory research may even reveal which committees are thought to be most powerful given 
which committee seats and chairs are held by powerful directors. Further, scholars may use research on equity 
among directors to explore whether the equity concentration of committee members may improve monitoring 
among audit committee members or enhance shareholder value creation through executive compensation. 
Such findings may build on research by Deutsch et al. (2011) who identified that stock options provided to 
directors are more effective in encouraging firm risk than those provided to CEOs. Finally, it may be beneficial to 
utilize prior research on the types of institutional investors and blockholders to explore whether differences in 
owner preferences influence committee outcomes. For instance, the existence of a transient institutional 
investor on the compensation committee may result in a significantly different executive compensation 
arrangement than one in which a dedicated institutional investor was appointed to the committee. Such 
arrangements may result in greater principal-principal conflicts. 
Methodological Improvements 
Endogeneity 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) asserted that since boards are developed by firms to address potential agency 
problems, studies examining boards suffer from endogeneity as the variables of interest are often endogenous. 
Additionally, since a director's membership on a committee is not random, the relationships between members’ 
characteristics and various firm and board outcomes are likely to be endogenous. For example, prior research 
has examined how compensation committee members’ diversity, pay, and social status (Belliveau et al., 1996; 
Conyon and He, 2004; Conyon and Peck, 2004) impact executive compensation. Yet, directors are appointed to 
the compensation committee based on their prior experiences and behaviours (e.g., Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; 
Kesner, 1988). Not accounting for selection bias in committee membership or overlooking the impact of the full 
board could raise validity concerns about the effects of directors’ characteristics on executive compensation. 
Similarly, scholars examining the formation of committees, especially less traditional ones, may face 
endogeneity concerns. 
As shown in Tables 3 through 4, we have noted studies in which the research design accounted for endogeneity 
in its methodological approach. In our review, only 20 per cent of pre-2001 studies employed analytical 
specifications to deal with endogeneity; however, over 75 per cent of the post-2010 studies employed such 
methods. These findings suggest that methodological rigor today is more commonly employed by scholars and 
expected by leading journals. While finance scholars were the first to emphasize and address this issue, it is clear 
that such rigor is now considered essential in accounting and management research. Gupta and Wowak (2017), 
for example, utilized instrumental variables, Heckman selection models, and fixed-effects regression to address 
reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity. Other scholars have used similar methods to validate that 
results have not been influenced by endogenous factors (e.g., Bruyneels and Cardinaels, 2013; Hoitash et 
al., 2009). It is imperative that scholars continue to utilize appropriate techniques to alleviate endogeneity 
concerns; however, we are encouraged by the increasing attention paid to methodological considerations of 
endogeneity.8 
Measurement of committee independence 
Research primarily operationalizes committee independence as either a continuous variable, measured as the 
percentage of independent committee members, or as a dichotomous variable set to 1 when a majority of 
members are independent (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2012) or there is an independent lead director 
(Cheng et al., 2010). Given changes in independence requirements following SOX (see Table 2), it is important to 
consider how independence is measured. Consistent with our previous recommendation for a more 
comprehensive view on independence, we offer four suggestions to scholars which would enable an 
examination of committee member independence in line with today's governance climate. First, for committees 
in which the traditional measure of independence can still be used, relationships should be explored using a 
proportional, rather than dichotomous, measure of independence. Second, alternative measures of social 
dependence, capturing an extensive array of connections, are needed to understand if committee members act 
independently. Third, the longevity of a committee member, both overall and in relationship to the CEO, should 
be used to consider whether the committee member is too bound to firm history or the CEO to act 
independently. Lastly, scholars are encouraged to develop more behaviourally-oriented measures of 
independence, including scales that apply survey-based methodologies. 
Alternative sources of data collection 
We have a limited understanding of how board committees function and this is mainly due to the exclusive 
reliance on archival methods for obtaining data on board committees. While we recognize that it is extremely 
difficult to achieve sufficient response rates or access when surveys or qualitative methodologies are employed, 
we reaffirm the previous call of Johnson et al. (2013) that scholars examining boards need to gain better access 
to executives and board members, since closer and more personal access is essential to understanding how 
board committees function. In particular, even limited observation of committee meetings could yield insights 
on how committee members interact with each and with the broader board. There is likely to be considerable 
variation in the degree to which the full board is informed about the committee's work, and understanding how 
these interactions affect not only the committee, but also the board's knowledge and information, could be 
beneficial. 
Conclusion 
Board committee research has been a growing field. However, despite the increased attention from various 
disciplines, such as management, finance, and accounting, the literature on board committees has developed 
rather independently and with little integration. The purpose of this review was to aggregate existing board 
committee research, synthesize the main antecedents to committee formation and membership, and outline 
the key outcomes associated with board committees. Based on this review, we identified weaknesses and gaps 
in prior research that could be leveraged to generate new and exciting knowledge about board committees. 
From these findings, we proposed a series of recommendations for future research. We believe that greater 
focus on independence, committee members’ human and social capital, committee diversity and power, and 
interactions between various committees could significantly enhance our understanding of board committees’ 
role in corporate governance. We are hopeful that our review spurs new scholarship related to board 
committees, as this is where the real work is accomplished in boards. 
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